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Abstract 
The European Union’s so-called Partnership Instrument (PI) captures the changing psychology of 
EU relations with rising powers, and has been designed to give more room for manoeuvre for EU 
external action. Two years of practice leading up to the 2017 Mid-Term Review have shown that 
the PI is instrument-driven rather than objective-driven, and that its strategic potential is 
undermined by lengthy committee-based procedures and sector-based programming. In an arena 
of vested interests, the PI’s significance is tied up with what EU stakeholders want to make of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). National foreign ministries struggle to connect national 
objectives with EU interests, apart from the wider debate not addressed here as to where European 
interests come from when they are not based on national objectives. This article argues that 
national foreign ministries should consider the potentially positive effect on EU external action of 
this relatively small initiative, notably as the instrument to connect one European entity to other 
global powerhouses. EU member states have so far been unable to link fully with the PI, and – like 
the EEAS and the European Parliament – they have too little clout to exert influence on the 
European Commission. The EU Global Strategy offers a window of opportunity for making the PI 




In March 2014 the European Parliament and Council adopted a European Commission proposal for 
the so-called Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries (PI), a financing 
instrument of € 955 M. The PI was meant to underpin the changing relationship with developed 
countries, with special attention for middle-income countries outside the West.1 The Partnership 
Instrument was incorporated into the Multi-Financial Framework 2014–2020, thereby replacing the 
Industrialised Countries Instrument and complementing the six other EU external financing 
instruments such as the much larger European Development Fund (€ 30.5 billion), the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (€ 19.662 billion) and the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (€ 15.433 billion). 
 
The PI supports cooperation with extra-European strategic partners, mainly in Asia and the 
America’s, which feed into or result from the EU’s political and sectoral dialogues with these 
countries. It addresses a wide range of issues, including industrial and trade standards, 
                                                          
1 Regulation, see online. For this  article, the authors conducted interviews with twenty officials at the EU EEAS, 
the European Commission, European Parliament, and the Netherlands Foreign Ministry (23 February 2016 and 
26 May 2016). A short survey was conducted at Dutch embassies and EU delegations in the four Asian Strategic 
Partner countries of the EU: China; India; South Korea; and Japan. 
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environmental protection, cyber issues and information and communication technology, aviation, 
migration and mobility, and raw materials. All PI projects share a common denominator: they are 
in the interests of the European Union (EU) and they represent global issues of growing 
importance. The instrument aims to forward EU relationships with strategic partner countries, while 
simultaneously strengthening global governance in an increasingly multipolar world.  
 
In spite of its small financial size, the PI is of considerable political significance for the EU as a 
diplomatic actor. In its relations with established and particularly emerging global partners that are 
no longer eligible for EU development aid, the EU has no other financial means to promote its 
external identity through actions on the ground. Nobody imagines that Brussels will take over 
bilateral relationships with some of the most powerful countries, but is it realistic to keep ploughing 
the straight furrow of 28 bilateral relationships? 
 
After two years of experience and in the year of the 2017 Mid-Term Review, one key and not 
unfamiliar problem is that the European External Action Service (EEAS) in reality has little influence 
on the EU Partnership Instrument - the irony being that the PI was designed to help reshape 
diplomatic relations with increasingly relevant powers on the global scene. The rigid programme – 
rather than an objective-driven approach to EU external relations by the Commission – sits 
uneasily with the requirements of political engagement in a world full of surprises. The lack of 
interest and strategic perspective on PI by EU member states further complicates how the 
European diplomatic service can give direction to Europe’s relationship with chiefglobal powers. 
Ahead of the 2017 PI mid-term evaluation, the question of how to move ahead with this tool is 
timely. The answer may give an indication of where the EU is taking its wider diplomatic 
experiment. 
 
This article argues that the Partnership Instrument is a promising tool in supporting the EU’s 
aspirations of enhanced international standing, provided that it will be more strategic, political and 
flexible. The 2016 EU Global Strategy offers a conceptual framework for a revamped future 
Partnership Instrument. A decision to discontinue the PI would have a negative psychological 
impact on the EEAS and on the EU’s external relations capacity. EU member states may think that 
they would hardly notice the difference of an EU without the Partnership Instrument, but they are 
advised to appraise the consequences of not aspiring to such a potentially flexible EU tool. 
 
An Inflexible Instrument 
The Partnership Instrument supports cooperation with the EU’s strategic partners, a heterogeneous 
group of developed and emerging powers. The EU’s strategic partners are currently: the United 
States; China; Brazil; India; South Africa; South Korea; Canada; Japan; and Mexico. This means 
that they do, for instance, include the whole of IBSA (that is, India, Brazil and South Africa), the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) except for Russia, and MIKTA (that is, 
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) without Indonesia and Australia. The list of 
strategic partners inevitably draws attention to the issue of excluding other rising powers from this 
‘non-club’. The EU has never really recovered from the controversy surrounding the choice of its 
strategic partners, or the lack of clarity about the criteria and concrete aims of strategic 
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partnerships. The 2016 EU Global Strategy introduces ‘core partners’ (the United States and the 
United Nations), thus still clinging to the practice of labelling actors but gradually preparing a quiet 
exit for the category of strategic partner.2 
 
Crucially, the Partnership Instrument has been designed to advance core EU interests as well as 
common challenges of global concern. The PI’s Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2014–
2017 allocates the instruments’ budget among four headings: 1) Global challenges (notably climate 
change, energy security and the environment) and policy support (38 per cent); 2) External scope 
of Europe 2020 strategy (16 per cent); 3) Market access, trade, investment and business 
opportunities (26 per cent); and 4) Academic cooperation, public diplomacy and outreach (10%).3 
The body responsible for the instrument’s programme management is the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments (FPI), an institutional hybrid which falls under the European Commission but is 
operating from the premises of the EEAS. On a yearly basis, the EEAS Headquarters and its EU 
Delegations identify projects with partner countries, after which input from the EEAS, EU 
Delegations and the European Commission Directorates-General (DGs) feeds into an Annual Action 
Plan (AAP) that is subject to the consent of member state governments and scrutiny by the 
European Parliament. The implementation of specific projects is mostly carried out by consultants 
after a call for tenders/proposals, while EU Delegations monitor the implementation in partner 
countries. 
 
The origins of the Partnership Instrument cannot be characterised as the outcome of a process of 
intra-institutional bargaining, to the extent that the EEAS was not yet an actor of any significance 
on the Brussels bureaucratic landscape. EEAS teething troubles and its lack of clout in Brussels, as 
well as the deficient operational capacity at headquarters and its slowly advancing capacity to give 
directions and operate in sync with the almost 140 EU Delegations, have withheld the EU 
diplomatic service from counterbalancing the European Commission’s firm grip on the Partnership 
Instrument. PI projects with strategic partners mainly revolve around traditional Commission 
topics, including such themes as innovation, trade, climate and energy, which are subject to 
European Commission programming practices in a seven-year multi-financial framework.  
 
Commission officials overseeing the PI operation manage it with professionalism, albeit within the 
clear parameters of the framework that has been given to them. The turbulent world facing the EU 
is, however, rather resistant to Commission procedures and routines. In the wake of the 2016 EU 
Global Strategy, the institutional infrastructure of EU diplomacy will have to confront this issue, 
which cannot be left unresolved without harming EU interests in a volatile international 
environment. Foreign ministries will have to make the necessary connection between the 
operational Partnership Instrument and what they expect from diplomatic action at the EU level. 
The Partnership Instrument is, after all, a unique tool helping the EU to adapt to evolving relations 
with its strategic partners, and it can help EU member states – including the larger nations – to 
gain improved access to the governments of emerging powers. 
                                                          
2 See https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. 
3 10 per cent of the budget is not being allocated from the outset of programming. For the Multi-annual 




From the point of view of the EEAS, the first two years of the Partnership Instrument have been 
marked by frustration over the failure to obtain ownership of the instrument, but this is 
understandable given that the EEAS itself was still in its infancy. While the European Commission’s 
machinery kick-started the PI and give the programme its present operational coherence, EEAS 
officials have described the coordination process between their headquarters and the EU 
Delegations as chaotic. The EEAS has very little agency when it comes to the relationship with the 
EU’s strategic partners. EEAS officials who take a strategic view on their institution’s mission as a 
sui generis diplomatic apparatus see the PI in its current form as little less than a poisoned chalice. 
Their argument is that the PI was presented and ‘sold’ as a flexible, operational tool that is capable 
of serving EU political priorities and addressing the changing circumstances in its external 
environment, and that is what it should be. One example of the lack of agency of the EEAS with 
regard to PI is academic cooperation, which falls outside the regular annual programming cycle of 
the PI. Instead of being allocated by the FPI, these funds are annually forwarded to the Erasmus+ 
programme. One could ask whether it is desirable that the PI budget is constrained by employing it 
for academic cooperation, which is also funded through other instruments. 
 
We argue that the PI does not have the flexibility that was part of the rationale behind creating the 
scheme. From 2014–2016, the so-called ‘fully operational EEAS’ possessed an instrument that 
contributed to the management of its relations with EU strategic partners without any flexibility. PI 
financial resources are allocated in a seven-year multi-financial framework that, apart from one 
mid-term review, leaves little room for adjustment. No more than € 48.2 million out of a total of € 
922.2 million in the total operational appropriations are currently reserved for contingencies.4 
Roughly 95 per cent of the PI budget is locked into projects that have been rubberstamped by the 
European Commission’s administrators who are located within the EEAS headquarters, but who still 
operate under rather inflexible Commission procedures designed for the programming and 
development of projects. The fundamental question of multiple EEAS interviewees appears to be 
justified: is it ‘logical that the same financial regulation is applied to structural funds as to external 
spending?’5 A positive first step is that PI budgets are now allocated globally rather than per 
country.  
 
The EU’s Fragmented GoverningElite 
The routines and procedures that have been developed to ensure the Partnership Instrument’s 
effectiveness do not fit the flexibility needed to meet the objectives of EU foreign policy and 
diplomacy. Despite the fact that the PI intends to take into account political contexts and is meant 
to be ‘innovative in terms of objectives’, it is clearly a product of the European Commission, which 
designed the PI before the EEAS was up and running.6 This is reflected by the main topics covered 
through PI funding, which already receive financial resources through other EU mechanisms. This 
state of affairs clearly exposes the European Commission to the accusation from within the EEAS 
                                                          
4 MIP, p. 25, Annex I: Partnership Instrument – Indicative Financial Allocations 2014–2020 in MEUR. 
5 Interview with EEAS official (25 May 2016), Brussels. 
6 Regulation (EU) No. 234/2014 (11 March 2014) establishing a Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with 
Third Countries, preambles 4 and 19. 
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that this is a case of superfluous funding for the Commission’s sectoral “pet projects”. Moreover, 
the European Commission’s FPI to manage the PI operates strictly within the given legal 
framework, which also constrains its view on the nature of ‘political priorities’. To reduce the PI’s 
flexibility further, thematic experts from Commission DGs that deliver crucial input hardly take into 
account the political–strategic context of EU foreign policy, and they may not have a very good 
sense of what is happening on the ground in partner countries. In the first two years of PI 
operations, similar tendencies could be observed in the EU Delegations, where programming 
managers seconded from the FPI, or sectoral experts seconded from the European Commission’s 
DGs, are responsible for project identification. What should not be forgotten is that the European 
Parliament shares co-responsibility for the limited scope of action of the EEAS. In 2009, the 
Parliament did not succeed in incorporating the EEAS within the Commission, but it did secure the 
concession that ‘the responsibility for the operating budgets on the EU foreign policy programmes 
remained in the hands of the Commission’.7 
 
The EEAS’s inability to fulfil effectively its role as coordinator was illustrated with characteristic self-
confidence in the European Commission’s press release for the 2016 PI Annual Action Plan, which 
does not make a single reference to the EEAS. The division of responsibilities on the Partnership 
Instrument between the European Commission and the EEAS is reflected in a culture of 
collaboration that is not comparable with that of an integrated national diplomatic service. Brussels’ 
diplomatic machinery simply does not function as a ‘coherent governing elite’, a feature that would 
work in the interests of more effective EU diplomacy.8 
  
Why Diplomatic Mind-sets Matter 
It is hard to find a national equivalent for the different kinds of professional mind-sets sharing the 
same policy-making space as is the case in Brussels. The competencies of European Commission 
and EEAS officials diverge and they have different mind-sets. The ties between the Commission’s 
line DGs and the FPI managers sharing the same background are strong. While Commission 
officials instinctively fear politicisation that interferes with professional project management, they 
do not like to be judged by EEAS officials, who they consider to be ‘bad managers’, insufficiently 
informed to contribute to original policy-making on themes of Commission competence. In turn, 
EEAS diplomats blame Commission practice as an obstacle for efforts led by the EEAS, and they 
see the lack of political sensitivity among Commission technocrats as a serious obstacle for 
Europe’s diplomacy.9 As far as the Partnership Instrument is concerned, an unhelpful fatalistic 
tendency has emerged within the EEAS to ‘leave programming to the techies at FPI’.10 Not all EEAS 
officials manage to handle labyrinthine Commission procedures competently or successfully 
 
                                                          
7 Christian Lequesne, ‘EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Practice Theory: A Different Approach to the 
European External Action Service’, Cooperation and Conflict, 17/1 (2015), p. 5. 
8 David Spence, ‘The Early Days of the European External Action Service: A Practitioner’s View’, The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, 7/1 (2012), p. 133. 
9 Edward Burke, ‘Europe’s External Action Service: Ten Steps towards a Credible EU Foreign Policy’, Centre for 
European Reform Policy Brief (July 2012), p. 5; and Lequesne, ‘EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Practice 
Theory’, pp. 7–8. 
10 Interview, EEAS official (25 May 2016), Brussels. 
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This status quo reinforces a considerable degree of mutual stereotyping, as well as resentment, 
about missed EU opportunities for international dialogue that could help to raise the EU’s profile, 
such as, for instance, in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. A more politically relevant Partnership 
Instrument would require that the strategically thinking levels within the EEAS become better 
connected with the Commission’s specialist professionals within FPI who are in charge of 
programming. At the moment, detailed PI procedures work to the advantage of the European 
Commission. National governments and the European Parliament have their say when it comes to 
the adoption of Annual Action Plans, but in reality bureaucratic procedures have been designed in 
such a way that they can hardly influence their content.  
 
The Art of Strategic Partnering 
This article does not engage with the existing literature on ‘strategic partnerships’, which has done 
a good job in critically evaluating their utility as a special category for EU external relations.11 The 
exclusive country-based approach implicit in the choice of strategic partners has been increasingly 
contested within and outside the EU. The EEAS has been repeatedly criticised for failing to define 
strategic partnerships, articulating their essence, or making clear what their concrete aims are. 
Now that the EU’s declaratory foreign policy is starting to embrace a more hybrid and multi-actor 
world, the category of ‘strategic partners’ is unlikely to be mentioned in future EU foreign policy 
statements and will probably fade into the background. Still, the diplomatic challenge of the EU 
partnering with pivotal members of the society of states, particularly those outside the small group 
of like-minded countries, will not go away.  
 
Outside the EU and the Western world, the PI’s daily practices illustrate how moving from 
development cooperation to a more equal relationship involves significant psychological adaptation, 
as well as operational challenges at the EU Delegation level. The PI can therefore be seen as a 
micro-barometer of the changing relations with ‘graduated’ third countries, to use the somewhat 
paternalistic Brussels terminology. The willingness of the partner country governments to engage 
the EU’s current 28 nations via the EU institutions rather than via individual governments is, of 
course, a necessary condition of success. The record from the first two years shows that partner 
countries are not always willing to engage in the EU’s intended way. Moving the needle in the EU’s 
relations with cautious strategic partners requires diplomacy and persuasion on the ground, a point 
that can be typically underestimated in Brussels-centred administrative processes.  
 
The need in EU external action to understand the experiences and frames of reference of non-
Western strategic partners may seem obvious. First, the need for more empathy in dealing with 
these strategic partners, as a condition of professional diplomacy, requires an EU diplomatic effort. 
                                                          
11 Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira and Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, ‘The European Union’s Strategic Partnerships: 
Conceptual Approaches, Debates and Experiences’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29/1 (2016), pp. 
3–17; Luis F. Blanco, ‘The Functions of Strategic Partnership in European Union Foreign Policy Discourse’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29/1 (2016), pp. 36–54; Giovanni Grevi, ‘Why EU Strategic 
Partnerships Matter’, ESPO working paper no. 1 (2012), see online; Thomas Renard, ‘The Treachery of 
Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships’, Egmont Paper no. 45 (2011), see online; and Dara 
Marcus and Marcel Sangsari, ‘Strategic Partnership as an Instrument of EU Foreign Policy’, Workshop Report, 




In the sometimes fragile relationships with foreign governments, persuasion should come before 
programme management. It takes two to tango, and one of the PI’s pivotal negotiation challenges 
– that is, dealing with partial indifference or even non-cooperation by its designated strategic 
partners – may be underestimated by officials in Brussels with a more technocratic mind-set 
leaving less room for empathy. Particularly those countries that formerly received generous EU 
development aid, for instance India, do not always see the added value of the PI. Contrary to the 
big European Development Fund (EDF) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the 
compact Partnership Instrument aims to serve EU interests, PI project budgets are typically small, 
and third countries have no formal say in their programming.  
 
How non-cooperation can hinder successful implementation became clear in the PI initiative that 
aimed to support an Emissions Trading Scheme in South Korea. The EU’s version of the talks is 
that the South Korean government in Seoul purposefully and successfully watered down what 
initially seemed a promising scheme. These experiences have made clear that third countries will 
only remain committed if PI initiatives take into account joint political priorities. In this respect, the 
Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) and the EC Policy Support 
Facility (PSF) projects set a good example. They are short, require only moderate funding, they are 
more appropriate in that they can respond quickly to evolving political needs, and they show visible 
results. One clear example is the Clean Ganga initiative, a political flagship project for India’s 
government that is now supported by the EU. The Ganges project shows how the PI plays an 
important complementary role to other diplomatic channels, such as summit meetings and ongoing 
dialogues with these countries. One example in relations with India, which is not an easy strategic 
partner, is that the ground for the March 2016 EU–India Water Partnership was prepared by the 
Clean Ganga initiative. PI projects can thus feed into meetings between heads of government and 
vice versa, and they can either prepare sectoral and political dialogues or take them to a higher 
level. 
 
Second, as the 2015 report on Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU’s Policies Abroad 
confirmed, public diplomacy plays a considerable role in enhancing the EU’s profile as a sui generis 
international actor. The reality is that the further one is removed from Europe, the less people and 
government elites know about what the EU does. EU credibility is a major factor in keeping third 
countries on board. EU Delegations therefore see public diplomacy as a more important aspect of 
the Partnership Instrument than may be suggested by the proportion of funding.12 
 
Member State Impact 
The EEAS has been set up in such a way that it allows EU member states to exercise a significant 
amount  of control over this post-Westphalian diplomatic institution. This takes place through 
various mechanisms of direct monitoring that have been characterised as ‘police patrol’.13 Yet with 
respect to the Partnership Instrument, national foreign ministries are little more than paper tigers, 
                                                          
12 Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU’s Policies Abroad (December 2015), p. 14, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/showcases/eu_perceptions_study_en.htm. 
13 Hrant Kostanyan, ‘Analysing Power of the European Union’s Diplomatic Service: Do the EU Member States 
Control the European External Action Service?’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11/1 (2016), p. 29. 
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as they have little impact on decision-making by the PI Committee. There is every likelihood that 
EU member states’ ministries of foreign affairs, seeing the Partnership Instrument through 
budgetary spectacles, have come to the conclusion that the PI is a paltry tool. It takes little 
imagination to see how it ended up at the bottom of national governments’ foreign policy priority 
lists. If the PI wants to live up to its potential, the failure to bring synergies between EU and 
national initiatives should be addressed. The question is to what extent member state foreign 
ministries really understand the nature and added value of the PI, and whether there are 
differences of perception between big and small member states. 
 
The glaring contrast between the discursive coherence of EU external relations and diplomatic 
realities on the ground will not come as a surprise to EU pundits or foreign ministries. EU member 
state diplomats with a default mode of clinging to national sovereignty are nevertheless advised to 
make a connection between national foreign policy on the one hand and the implementation of 
operational Commission programmes and EU strategic policies on the other. Our research findings 
suggest that EU member state foreign ministries do not show much consideration of the 
Partnership Instrument and tend to overlook its larger diplomatic significance. The reluctance of 
foreign ministries in EU member states to think strategically about the EU Partnership Instrument 
can be explained by a predisposition for thinking about foreign policy in terms of national 
sovereignty, but we suggest that it may also be partially rooted in a lack of strategic capacity, or 
unwillingness, to relate national foreign policy objectives to EU aims. 
 
Foreign ministries have paid very little attention to the eminently political significance of PI in the 
family of European Commission financial instruments and in practice it appears that their 
ownership of the scheme has clear limits. Our research suggests that even diplomats have little 
awareness of the PI in the first place. The words of one interviewee reflect the common mood: ‘the 
PI is not well known, and contrary to the European Development Fund, nobody has an opinion 
about it’. Countering the question of why EU member states should connect to PI initiatives, one 
EEAS official summed up puzzlement within the EU diplomatic service: ‘don’t the member states 
have ideas on what is important for themselves and the EU in the field of foreign affairs?’ There is 
indeed reluctance in EU member states’ ministries of foreign affairs and embassies, although surely 
in varying degrees, to think in terms of synergies between the EU and its member states’ foreign 
policies. As a majority of Europeans foresee a bigger role for the EU bloc on the world stage, and 
pertinent questions are being raised as a result of the UK’s coming exit from the EU as well as fears 
of a protectionist Trump administration in the United States, now may be the time for national 
governments to become serious about the EU’s external identity.14 In order to align national and 
EU foreign policy actions, there seems to be merit in joint programming. 
 
EU Diplomatic Performance 
The EU’s diplomatic capacity, i.e. its actual or potential ability to perform as a sui generis 
diplomatic actor, is evidently a necessary condition for the Partnership Instrument, which should be 
based on strategic guidance from the top and a functioning reality in the EU’s relationship with 
                                                          
14 Pew Research Center, ‘Europeans Face the World Divided’ (13 June 2016), available online at 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/, pp. 4 and 23. 
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partner countries. The Global Strategy addresses many of the issues with the PI that have been 
discussed in this article. This strategy, drawn up under supervision of High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) 
Federica Mogherini, first of all underlines EU interests, which form the rationale of the PI. It further 
emphasises the ambition of building budgetary flexibility into the financial instruments, and it calls 
for capacity-building in the EEAS and the EU Delegations, while advocating a more political role for 
EU diplomacy. The Global Strategy explicitly acknowledges the function of public diplomacy and it 
attaches greater importance to political themes such as cyber-, energy, cultural and economic 
diplomacy. Moreover, as discussed above, the Global Strategy steps away from the concept of 
strategic partnerships and underscores the need to partner selectively with relevant players for 
relevant objectives, which include core partners, like-minded countries, regional groupings, 
international organisations, and cooperative regional orders such as the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
Gradual change in relations between EU Delegations and EU member states’ embassies is of direct 
relevance to the functioning of the Partnership Instrument, and it merits serious field research. The 
EU may favour a ‘driving role’ for the EU Delegations, but it appears that they still operate in a 
sphere of operational ambiguity that confines their effectiveness. The EEAS does not yet have the 
necessary capacity either to instruct EU Delegations properly or to cope with their feedback. As 
Heidi Maurer and Kirsti Raik argue: ‘No clear definition has been provided of the scope of their 
competences towards the host administration and vis-à-vis member states’ embassies, including a 
clear delimitation of where and when the delegations should take the lead’.15 Moreover, European 
Commission officials form a majority in the Delegations, some of which have only one or two 
diplomatic staff, and they continue to receive instructions from the Commission instead of the 
EEAS. From the point of view of national foreign ministries, the debate matters as to whether the 
EU diplomatic service creates added value or infringes upon EU member states’ sovereignty. In the 
context of the PI, our first impression from interviews and a small survey (yet to be tested on a 
wider scale) is that synergies have thus far hardly been accomplished. Although EU Delegations 
profess that they share information on PI initiatives and align with EU member states’ priorities in 
counsellor and head of mission meetings, Dutch embassies in our survey appeared to be less 
sanguine on the information retained by them, or indeed received from EU Delegations. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
It would be advisable for the upcoming 2017 mid-term review of the Partnership Instrument to 
translate the aspirations of the Global Strategy into its partnering practices and instruments. At the 
same time, the Global Strategy is a political document that makes the point that ‘the time has 
come to consider reducing the number of instruments to enhance our coherence and flexibility, 
while raising the overall amount dedicated to development’. Abolishing the PI is not advisable, but 
might become a realistic option if reform in favour of more flexibility and greater room for 
manoeuvre for the EEAS is not going to materialise. National foreign ministries are furthermore 
                                                          
15 Heidi Maurer and Kirsti Raik, ‘Pioneers of a European Diplomatic System: EU Delegations in Moscow and 
Washington’, FIIA Analysis no. 1, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (May 2014), pp. 14–15. 
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advised not to overlook how cancellation of the Partnership Instrument would negatively impact on 
morale inside a European External Action Service that is largely in their control. It is in the 
interests of small EU member states that are experiencing access issues with larger EU strategic 
partners to value the complementarity of concrete EU Partnership Instrument initiatives.  
 
We conclude with the following six policy recommendations for EU governments. First, from the 
perspective of strengthening EU diplomacy it would make sense to consider modernising the 
Partnership Instrument and making it more flexible and capable of meeting political objectives. An 
objective-driven Partnership Instrument would depart from the past experience of more 
technocratic, process-driven PI dynamics. Greater agency for the EEAS is in the interests of flexible 
EU external action. It would therefore make sense for Commission staff and the EU Delegations’ 
input into the PI to address the strategic and political context, as defined by the EEAS. Second, 
when evaluating the EU’s financial instruments, it is advisable to increase the Partnership 
Instrument’s budget in the interests of more politically relevant programming that enhances the 
EU’s global credibility. 
Third, when looking at the Partnership Instrument, national foreign ministries in EU member states 
are advised to take into account strategic considerations regarding the desired role of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor. It is in the interests of member states, above all small to medium-sized ones,  
to give attention to the question of how EU diplomacy provides added value to bilateral cooperation 
efforts. Fourth, EU member state officials should bear in mind that failure to support actively the 
Partnership Instrument may contribute to the erosion of the EEAS and EU external action, with 
potentially unintended consequences for a Union that is already affected by an internal legitimacy 
deficit, member state defection and new challenges emerging from its biggest strategic partner by 
far, the United States. Fifth, our analysis suggests that foreign ministries and EU member state 
embassies would do well to take measures that signal their interest in co-determining the future of 
the Partnership Instrument, thus aiming to enhance their agency in the development of PI and its 
actions in partner countries. Sixth, paradoxically EU member states would strengthen their own 
national interest-based relations with strategic partners by investing in Partnership Instrument-
focused dialogue with EU Delegations, and by doing so would make a contribution to the 
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